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The book under review introduces an innovative approach to a formal
theory of action. Many ideas introduced by the author were presented
in some of his earlier papers published in the 90s. Moreover, fragments
of the book have been presented at many conferences (one noted by the
author is Logic and its Applications in Philosophy and the Foundations
of Mathematics, a conference organized annually since 1996 in Poland).
The book, therefore, presents concepts that are results of many years of
work and might be considered as a continuation and an important part
of a praxeological tradition introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbiński.
The author discusses mathematical, logical and philosophical aspects
of a theory of action. The main issues analysed in the book concern
models of actions, the language of action systems, a problem of non-
probabilistic and probabilistic performability of actions, relations with
theory of algorithms and programming, a deontic logic based on intro-
duced models of the action theory1, a problem of non-monotonic reason-
ing and models of knowledge within a framework of action theory. One
1 Speaking of deontic logic, this year conference of Trends in Logic XVII (Lublin,
12–15.09.2017) is wholly devoted to problems and applications of that branch of philo-
sophical logic. The topic of the conference is: Traditional and new perspectives on
deontic logic and agency modelling.
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of the biggest virtues of the book is that the analysis is illustrated by
intuitive examples which explain how the formal theory works and to
what kind of problems it might be applied. All those factors make the
book an important and interesting contribution in the study of models
of action and their applications.
The book consists of two parts, each of them containing three chap-
ters. The first part of the book introduces relevant definitions and some
facts about action theory. It determines some methods of analysis and
some special cases of elementary action systems with their formal prop-
erties. The second part of the book contains a description of actions
in deontic contexts and examines non-monotonic reasoning in epistemic
discourse.
In the first chapter the reader finds a definition of an elementary
action system, which is a basic notion of the theory. An elementary
action system (in short: EAS) is a triple consisting a set of states W , a
binary relation R ⊆ W × W , which is called relation of direct transition
and a set of atomic actions A. An atomic action A is considered as a
binary relation between states, so A ⊆ W ×W . The basic idea is simple:
an action means a change from one state to another according to some
rules, restrictions, etc. which determine a possible transition between
states. So the transition might be accomplished by some atomic action
in an EAS if the action changes one state to another, if the action holds
(see p. 9). A possible performance of an atomic action might be realized
in an EAS if a proper transition holds. In the first chapter different
families of EASes are classified as separative, normal or equivalential (see
p. 13). A compound action is determined as a set of finite sequences
of atomic actions of A from a given EAS and might be considered as
a language over a set A (see p. 50). Some set-theoretic operations on
compound actions are defined and an algebraic structure on the family
of compound actions of an EAS is introduced.
The author emphasizes on p. 13 that one of the goals of an EAS is to
“assure implementation of a given task, that is, to provide a bunch of
strings of atomic actions which would lead from Φ-states to Ψ-states”,
where Φ, Ψ ⊆ W . In the book we find a lot of quite intuitive examples
which show how an EAS reaches that goal (see p. 13–21). The author
considers for example a well-known logical puzzle about missionaries
and cannibals who want to cross a river or the simplified situation of the
washing in an automatic washing machine.
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In the first chapter two approaches to the performability of actions
are discussed. According to the first, non-probabilistic one, in reference
to a chess game:
[. . . ] performing an action resembles a chess player’s deliberate move
across the chessboard  it is a conscious choice of one of many possi-
bilities of the direct continuation of the game. If such possibilities do
not exist, e.g., when the nearest squares where the white knight could
move are taken by other pieces, performing the actions  white chess-
men’s move  is impossible in this case. The eventuality of unintended
and accidental disturbances of the undertaken actions can be entirely
neglected. (p. 28)
According to the second, probabilistic one performability might be ex-
plained thus:
[. . . ] in terms of the chances of bringing about the intended effect of
the action in the given state and situation. [. . . ] the performability of
an action is the resultant of the agent’s abilities and the influence of
external forces of course of events. It is a kind of fame between the
agent an nature. (p. 28)
In order to express the probabilistic approach to performability the no-
tion of a probabilistic action system and the notion of bi-distribution are
defined. A probabilistic system is derived from an EAS by enriching it
“with families of probabilities providing a quantitative measure of the
performability of atomic actions” (p. 29). The author also considers some
problems with the formalism, which might be briefly described as prob-
lems to do with distinction between probabilistic and non-probabilistic
systems. Another issue is the performability of a compound action. It is
determined as a function of the performability of atomic actions, which
are elements of sequences consisting of a given compound action. More
precisely, a compound action A is performable if some sequence from A
is performable.
In case of the notion of an EAS such factors as time, locations, order
of actions, knowledge of the agents and so on are omitted. But in the
second chapter the author discusses how one can enrich an EAS to a
situational action system in order to take into account some contextual
aspects of actions. According to the formalism he introduces, a situation
is an ordered pair consisting of a state of an EAS and a label which refers
to some contextual aspect like time or location. This part of the book
also presents some remarks concerning algorithms of action based on an
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EAS and determines some relations between the action theory and theory
of algorithms.
The last chapter of the first part presents some important facts con-
cerning fixed points and their possible applications in the context of
the action theory. This part introduces the notion of an ordered action
system which is a result of combing a poset with an EAS and determines
relations between ordered and situational action systems.
The first chapter of the second part presents a deontology of actions.
The chapter starts with some analysis of norms and presents them as
deontological rules of conduct:
The issue whether a norm is a rule, a prescription, etc. depends on
the category (or rather a class) of distinguished action systems  the
character of a given class of action systems determines the respective
category of associated norms. (p. 148)
And on the next page:
Norms define the ways and circumstances in which actions are per-
formed, e.g. by specifying the place, time, and order of their perfor-
mance, or by forbidding their use for the second time. (p. 149)
The author introduces a deontic logic based on his action theory and
the logic of atomic norms. In such a system deontic operators enable
one to form sentences with action variables instead of propositional ones.
The logic is defined syntactically as a set of schemata closed under modus
ponens. The first three axiom schemata are adequate to classical logic
while the last two characterize deontic operators. The first of them
states that what is obligated is also permitted, i.e., Oα → Pα, where
α ranges actions, and the second one states that what is forbidden is
what and only what is not permitted, i.e., Fα ↔ ¬Pα. A model of the
language is a Kripke model of modal logic enriched by a valuation which
assigns to each action a binary relation. The logic is proved to be sound
and complete. Additionally, an effective method for determining theses
is introduced. Furthermore, the author discusses the closure principle
which says that if an action is not forbidden, then it is permitted. One
of the last issues is a logic of righteous norms and the problem of the
consistency of elementary norms is analysed.
The second chapter is focused on the stit operator and stit semantics.
The author shows how to reconstruct stit models as a class of situational
actions systems. The understanding of ‘action’ undergoes a change,
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[. . . ] actions are seen [. . . ] as selections of preexistent histories or
trajectories of the system in time. Actions available to an agent in a
given state (moment) u are simply the cells of a partition of the set of
possible histories passing through u. Stit semantics is therefore time
oriented and time, being a situational component of actions, plays a
privileged role in this approach. (p. 196)
The last chapter presents an approach to epistemic actions which
“concern mental states of agents  they [epistemic actions] bring about
changes of agents’ knowledge or beliefs about environment as well as
about beliefs” (p. 209).
One of the biggest problems analysed in this chapter is how to define
a model of knowledge compatible with the dynamics of mental states. In
that context three tasks are emphasized by the author. Firstly, a tem-
poralization of the systems of epistemic logic expressed by the formalism
presented in the book. Secondly, a formalization of complex belief struc-
tures with a collective agent. And thirdly, a development of the action
theory so that it would not presuppose the omniscience of an agent.
The first two issues must be taken into account if a dynamic model of
knowledge-states is considered, since they are especially related to such
problems as the forming of and changing of beliefs. The last problem
matters if we want to have a realistic system of knowledge, where agents
might be wrong and make mistakes.
The author starts, however, with some general remarks concerning
knowledge and its properties; for instance, the Gettier problem is dis-
cussed. Next, a model of knowledge as a action system is defined. One
of the most important issues is the frame problem, which leads to the
question of formalisation of non-monotonic reasoning within the action
theory.
In reference to action theory the frame problem can be articulated as
the problem of identification and description of the conditions (state
of affairs, etc.) which are irrelevant or not affected by the actually
performed action. (p. 218)
From a formal point of view the frame problem raises a question of
how to define “a set of logical formulas describing the results of actions
without the need for taking into account factors being «non-effect of
those actions»” (p. 219). One of the solutions is to introduce some
frame axioms which specify these „non-effects of actions” and assume
that a situation is not changed by an action unless there is an evidence
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that it was affected by an action. However, as the author emphasizes,
as far as the logic is concerned, there appears to be a serious problem.
The consequence operation is usually assumed to be monotonic. Yet
new information might invalidate old conclusions. Monotonicity means
that we will not be able to exclude these conclusions. It is for this
reason that non-monotonic reasoning needs to be introduced into the
formalism. The frames for non-monotonic reasoning presented by the
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